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KYBERNETIKA — VOLUME 11 (1975), NUMBER 2 
Towards an Integrated Theory 
of Formal and Natural Languages 
PETR JlRKfj 
A number of works dealing with the problem of semantics of natural languages, discussed 
from the point of view of mathematics, has appeared in recent years. The purpose of this article 
is to summarize some main results and to show reasons for constructing such a mathematical 
theory of language that simultaneously captures the most important internal properties of formal 
languages and fragments of natural ones. The most interesting results concerning this problem 
can be found in Montague [9] which will be also our main reference. 
The author is deeply indebted to dr. P. Sgall and all his colleagues from the group of algebraic 
linguistics of the Centre of numerical mathematics (Charles Univ., Prague) for their most valuable 
suggestions and comments on this work. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mathematization 
There are two aims of linguistic investigations in the area of syntax. General rules 
for forming sentences of some language ought to be constructed first, and, at the same 
time, a general theory of formal structure of language must be created independent on 
specific properties of certain languages. Both these problems have long been studied 
thoroughly in the case of formal languages by using mathematical means and 
methods, and many interesting facts discovered. On the other hand many difficulties 
occur when we deal with natural languages. Here the problem arises whether 
mathematical methods are adequate for studying such complicated objects as 
natural languages are. If we use mathematical means to describe a language, we must 
be aware of a necessary idealization of natural language. A considerable variability 
of natural language leads to an impossibility of a fully adequate description of all 
its possible aspects. Thus we shall deal with a certain abstraction from natural lan-
guage and all our results concern this abstract mathematical model of language. 
Such an approach to a study of a language as an ideal object is typical for mathe-
matical linguistics. Since algebraic methods are predominantly used, our consider-
ations that follow belong to the domain of algebraic linguistics. 
Grammar 
One of fundamental notions in mathematical linguistics is the notion of grammar. 
One thing about grammar: it is a method how to put right words into right places. 
This characterization of grammar is, of course, very vague, but suggests and idea that 
grammar has to be a device generating, if possible all, well-formed sentences of 
a language in question. Nevertheless, there is no common agreement in the con-
ception of a well-formed sentence of a concrete natural language, for example of 
English. 
According to Chomsky, a grammar of a language is a system of rules that expresses 
the correspondence between sounds and meanings in this language. But it is known 
that with the approach of Chomsky and his followers the theoretical problems of 
semantics still remain open for discussion. We would like to devote the present 
paper to some comments concerning the effort to solve these problems on the base 
of formal logic, where questions of semantics have been treated in a systematic way. 
Having in mind that we deal with a language in the written form in our paper, we 
can modify Chomsky's definition in the following way: A grammar is a system of 
rules that states how to delimit well-formed sentences from a set of all finite sequences 
of symbols of a given language not only in the syntactic (usual in formal languages), 
but also in the semantic respects. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
Notation 
Unless it is specified otherwise, we essentially follow the notation of Montague as 
well as his basic terminology. It is a standard terminology and notation commonly 
used in the theory of sets and in general algebra. In particular, we shall use small 
Greek letters a,/?, y , . . . to refer to ordinal numbers. Thus the symbol (.a^}^<x 
denotes an a-place sequence of elements of the form a^, 2?{X) denotes the power set 
of a set X. Special symbols will be explained in the text. 
Basic algebraic notions and theorems 
An algebra is a system s? = <A, E.>;er, where A is a non-empty set, F is an index 
set of any sort, and each Fi is an operation on A. Two algebras are similar if they have 
the same number of same-place operations. Two similar algebras are homomorphic 
if there is at least one homomorphism between them. A homomorphism is such a map-
ping between two similar algebras that preserves operations. A notion of algebra is 
equivalent to the notion of a closure operator. A mapping C : SP(A) -» &(A) is 
a closure operator on A if it is reflexive, monotonous, transitive and compact. A set 
X s A is called a generator set of si if C(X) = A. A generator set X of si is a free 
base of si if for every similar algebra <% = <2J, G;>ier there is a homomorphism 
from A into B extending every mapping of the generator set X into B. An algebra is 
called free if it has at least one free base. It is a well-known fact that for every set X 
there is a free algebra of every given type. 
3. INTERPRETATION OF MONTAGUE'S THEORY 
OF UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 
Definition of language, syntax 
In this section we reproduce the fundamental definitions of syntactic notions which 
concern mathematical idealization of natural language. First we introduce the more 
simple notion of disambiguated language. A disambiguated language is to be under-
stood as a system Ld = (si, Xs, S, 50}deA such that si = <A, Ei>ier is a free algebra 
of expressions, Xd are subsets of expressions determining categories of basic expres-
sions indexed by some index set A, S is a set of syntactic rules and 30 is an index of 
the category of basic declarative sentences. Operations in the algebra of expressions 
are structural operations and a domain A of this algebra forms a set of all proper 
expressions, i.e. all the expressions that we obtain by repeated application of struc-
tural syntactic rules. Thus, the free algebra of expressions is generated by the union 
of all categories of basic expressions. A triplet s = <E;, <<5a>a</,, <5S> is a syntactic 
rule of the level <5S if Ft is an operation of algebra si and da, 8S are elements of the 
index set A. A disambiguated language Ld generates a class of syntactic categories SC 
provided that it is the smallest class of subsets of algebra si such that a) for each index 
<5 : X5 £ SCd, where X3 is a category of basis expressions, b) each syntactic rule s 
leads to the syntactic category of its level. It is not difficult to see that every disam-
biguated language generates exactly one class of syntactic categories. Categories of 
basic expressions of a disambiguated language, roughly speaking, correspond 
with parts of speech. 
A language in general is defined as a pair L = <Ld, R} where Ld is a disambiguated 
language defined above and R is a binary relation with its domain included in A. 
This relation characterizes an ambiguity and a synonymy in a language. 
94 Interpretation 
An interpretation for the language L = <Ld, R> is a system J = <B, G ; , j> t e r , 
where 3B = (B, G ;> ter is an algebra similar to the algebra of expressions stf = 
= {A, E;>ter of the language Land j is a function that maps the union of all categories 
of basic expressions Xa into B. Thus, a domain of the algebra 88 represents a set of all 
meanings that may be prescribed by the interpretation I, G; are semantic operations 
corresponding with structural operations F ; and the function j assigns meanings to 
basic expressions. A meaning assignment for language L determined by the inter-
pretation / is the unique homomorphism from s>$ to ^ extending the mapping j . 
Now we are able to distinguish meaningful expressions from the set of all finite 
sequences of symbols of an alphabet. A finite sequence of symbols is a meaningful 
expression provided it is a member of the union of all categories of expressions. 
Some fundamental linguistic definitions 
Notions of weak and strong synonymy can be also defined by using previous defini-
tions. The meaningful expressions a, a' are strongly synonymous in L with respect 
to the interpretation I if for every d e A the set of homomorphic images of those 
expressions that are in the relation R with a equals to the set of homomorphic images 
of those expressions that are in the relation R with a'. The meaningful expressions 
a, a' are weakly synonymous in L with respect to the interpretation J if sets of their 
meanings equal, i.e. sets of elements of algebra 38 that are prescribed by 7 to a and a'. 
Let / be an interpretation for L, V interpretation for L. The expressions a, a! are 
interlinguistically synonymous if they are meaningful expressions in L and L, respec-
tively, and they both have the same sets of meanings in I and / ' , respectively. 
It is obvious that all previous notions are essentially syntactic. Especially an inter-
pretation of a language says nothing about extralinguistic objects, it only distributes 
meanings among well-formed expressions. Only when some additional conditions 
are satisfied, an interpretation of language can be treated as a device generating 
referentional relations, i.e. relations among expressions and meanings in the sense 
of extralinguistic objects. 
4. THEORY OF SENSE AND THEORY OF REFERENCE 
The main prupose of this section is to study a special class of possible interpreta-
tions of a language in the sense mentioned above. It will be a class of semantic 
interpretations usually understood as relational structures. We therefore suppose 
that terms used in a language refer to non-linguistic entities which are called exten-
sions. These extensions are ontological entities built in an agreement with the formal 
structure of a language, i.e. individual expressions (constants) refer to individual 95 
entitites of ontology, one-place predicates refer to classes of entities, two-place predi-
cates to binary relations, etc. These extensions then play the role of an argument which 
forms a base for decision about truth-values of statements. This requirement will be 
exactly expressed in the definition of Fregean interpretations. 
However, a notion of intension of an expression is closely connected with the notion 
of extension. Since a semantic theory of language is traditionally constructed on an 
extensional basis, our aim is to show that there are good reasons to construct seman-
tics on an intensional basis, i.e. as a theory of sense. 
Denotation 
First, following Montague's explanation, we define a class of possible semantic 
types. Let e, t, s be mutually distinct atomic types. The class Tof all possible semantic 
types is the smallest class such that e (type of individual objects) and t(type of truth-
-values) are elements of T; for every two types <r, t the ordered pair <<x, T> (type of 
function from objects of type <x into objects of type T) is an element of T; for every 
type T an ordered pair <s, T> (type of a sense corresponding to object of type T) is 
an element of T. 
Let E and S be two disjoint non-empty sets. The set £ is intended as a set of onco-
logical entities, the set / a s a set of possible worlds. If both these sets are fixed, we 
can define for every semantic type T a set of possible denotates Dz by the following: 
£>,. = £ for T = e , 
Dz = {0, 1} for T = t, 
Dz = D°' for T = <<r, <?> , 
Dz = D'e for T = <s, Q) . 
Note. More precisely we should write DzEJf to register relation to given ontological 
entities and to the given set of intensions. 
Now, for every semantic type T we define an abstract set of possible meanings of 
an expression using a specific set J which will be interpreted as a set of contexts of 
use. For the time being we suppose nothing about the set J. Some comment will be 
given later. Let J be a non-empty set disjoint with £ and J, then the set of possible 
meanings of type T is Mz = Df
 x j . 
Note. Analogously to what has been said above, we should write precisely MZyE^j. 
The set M = \J Mz is called the set of all possible meanings connected with the 
language L. reT 
Let S0 be an index — a specific element of the set A. A set XSo £ A (where A is the 
domain of an algebra of expressions) is called a basic set of declarative sentences. 
Hence, we can define a type assignment function of language L as a mapping I : A -» T 
such that I(S0) = t. Therefore, we require only that this function assigns to every 
basic declarative sentence the semantic type belonging to truth-values. 
These definitions being given, a definition of Fregean interpretation can be for-
mulated. An interpretation I = <5, G.,/>;6 r of language Lis a Fregean interpreta-
tion if 
1) B £ M (i.e. the domain of interpretation is a subset of the set of all possible 
meanings), 
2) for every 8 e A and a e Xs, f(a) e MIW, 
3) if <E;, <<5?>, <5> is a syntactic rule of language Land b$ e MI{bi), then Gf^G^)) e 
e MKty 
This definition guarantees that Fregean interpretations satisfy our requirement so 
that extensions must correspond with formal structure of language, i.e. they form 
usual relational structure. 
Consequence operation 
We want to conclude our considerations about the theory of reference by the 
definition of semantic model. It is of course, necessary to create a general method 
which can give necessary and sufficient truth conditions for declarative sentences of 
a given language. Therefore, the notion of semantic consequence operation must 
be formulated without dependence on specific properties of language and adequately 
to the direct syntactic method of proof. Such a consequence operation can be defined 
as a special closure operator (see [6]). Let A be a non-empty set (e.g. a set of formulas); 
a mapping C : £P(A) -> ^ (A ) is a consequence operation on A if 
X £ C(X) , 
X £ Y-*C(X) £ c(Y), 
C(C(X)) £ C(X) 
for every set X, Y £ A. 
These three conditions are common for both consequence operations, i.e. for syn-
tactic and semantic ones. Moreover, the syntactic consequence satisfies a condition 
C(X) = U C(Y), 
y<=x 
FinlS-) 
where Fin (Y) denotes that Yis a finite set. A subset X of a set of formulas is called 
closed if C(X) = X. Then we can define conversely a consequence operation using a 
system H £ ^ (A ) such that it includes a set H and with every class of sets belonging 
to H it includes their intersection, or a set of all such closed sets that include a set X. 
This definition of the consequence operation permits an immediate comparison of 
two consequence operations from the point of view of inferential strength. It is not 
difficult to show that a class of all consequence operations on a given set with a partial 
ordering defined by inferential strength is a distributive lattice with zero and unit 
elements. This, of course, holds for an arbitrary set of formulas. 
Let Mod be a class of abstract relational structures intended as models of given 
formula (or theory) in language L. Supposing that extensions of compounds are only 
functions of their atoms (this is certainly correct for any formal language), we could 
consider a class of meaning assignments of a language L determined by model 
Ji e Mod, i.e. 
Stj, = {IM; Ji e Mod} , St0<M = {l0iM; I0_M = EMjXSo & Ji e Mod} . 
Then Sf0M is a class of mappings from declarative sentences into {0, 1}, where 
lM\Xio denotes the mapping IM partialized on the set Xdo. We define St = \J St M, 
Mod 
Sta — U St0 M. The system St0 then forms a base for indicating consequence relations 
Mod 
among declarative sentences. This follows immediately from the theorem of mutual 
definability, see [7]. 
Model, points of reference 
We proceed now to formulate the notion of model for natural languages. Here we 
must keep in mind one very important internal property of natural languages (which 
is accepted by majority of linguists), namely that it is not possible to assign truth-
values to the overwhelming majority of grammatical sentences of a certain natural 
language without specifying some additional delimitations which are not usually 
explicitly expressed. This fact may be explained by means of the following example. 
Let us consider the English sentence: 
"The wind blows" 
Such a sentence cannot be true or false unless we specify at least two coordinates 
of this event, namely its time and place. After that specification this sentence will 
be informationally equivalent to a more complete assertion, i.e. "The wind is blowing 
now in Prague". Here the time specification means the time-point at which the sen-
tence is pronounced. 
It is clear that more complicated examples can be introduced and a high variety 
of coordinates must be investigated. Some authors distinguish in addition to time 
and place such coordinates as for example speaker coordinates (to account for such 
sentences as " I am a teacher"), audience coordinates (to account for sentences as 
"You are a teacher"), indicated — objects coordinates (to account for sentences 
as "He is a teacher", "Those things are big"), etc. From these examples we can see 
that truth-values of declarative sentences must be relative to certain delimitations as 
it was mentioned above. Dana Scott, who originated this approach, calls a sequence 
of coordinates, required for the assignment of a truth-value to a given statement, 
an index. An extensive discussion about the variety of possible coordinates is presen-
ted in O. Dahl [4]. This treatment has been accepted by many linguists, since it makes 
it possible to account for deictic or indexical elements in a way deeper than that of 
Chomskyan grammars. 
In his recent work Montague [9], developing some of these ideas, has separated 
those coordinates which delimit context of use from other necessary specifications. 
A very instructive example of this idea can be cited from Dahl: "What an expression 
such as the leader of the British Labour Party or in general any description of the 
form "the individual that has the property F " refers to depends on two things. First, 
one must supply a point in time t such that the individual has the property F at t. 
Second, one must know something about what the world is like at t, namely who has 
the property F at t. In other words, the extension of the description depends on what 
world it is uttered in. The meaning of the description, in Montague's use of the term, 
then, is what is constant in the description regardless of the context of use and the 
world. The sense, on the other hand, is that which we obtain if we in addition to the 
meaning specify a context of use. For example, the leader of the British Labour 
Party, used in 1972, will have the same sense as the more complete description 
the leader of the British Labour Party in 1972, although their m e a n i n g s differ." 
Now it is evident that meanings are functions of two arguments, i.e. they are mappings 
from possible coordinates and contexts of use into extralinguistic objects. Moreover, 
in a more detailed analysis, possible coordinates may be regarded as n-ary vectors. 
Here, components of those vectors are all coordinates which must be necessarily 
specified for actual delimination of a meaning. It is obvious that such a treatment of 
possible coordinates expresses an old Leibniz's idea of possible and actual wordls, 
an idea which has later influenced conceptions of intensional semantics so signifi-
cantly. 
According to previous considerations the product J x J will be called a set of 
points of reference. A model Jt for language Lis then Jt = (3$, <i , ;"», where 3$ 
is a Fregean interpretation for L and <i,j> 6 J x J is a point of reference for 38. 
Evidently, i is here associated with actual world, j with actual context of use. A deno-
tation function for language L (determined by model Jl = (38, <i, j » ) is such a func-
tion h that maps expressions into meanings so that h(£) = fif<.,j>(^)- Here g is 
a meaning assignment function for language L and interpretation 38. 
Now, having a certain consequence operatin, we can define when a sentence <p 
of language Lis true. A sentence q> e Lis true with respect to model Jt = (38, <i, j>> 
if and only if there exists a declarative sentence \j/ in Ld such that \]/ R q> and h(\\j) = 1, 
where R is the ambiguity relation in Land h is a meaning assignment determined by 
the model Jt. 
We conclude this paragraph by a definition of a logically true sentence, which is 
based on a class of logically possible models of L. A class Mod of logically possible 
models for L is 
Mod = {Ji; Jt = <#, <.,;» &/(«)} , 
where / ( ^ ) means that M is such an interpretation that respects the formal structure 
of language Lin the previous sense. Now a sentence q> is logically true if it is true in 
all logically possible models. 
These last definitions make sure that many standard useful notions of mathematical 
logic can be reformulated into the language of Montague's universal grammar. 
However, the theory of universal grammar is not the only theoretical framework for 
an intensionalization of semantics. 
Another formalization 
In [10] P. Tichy* constructs a formal system based on Church's calculus of l-
conversion, which uses (analogously to Montague's system) a set of semantic types 
called here class of type symbols. The class of type symbols is the smallest class 
containing 1) atomic types: o (type of truth-values), i (type of individuals) and (i 
(type of possible worlds); 2) for every two types a, ft an ordered pair (a/?) (the type of 
a mapping from objects of type /? into objects of type a). It is not difficult to see that 
we can establish a correspondence among semantic types in Tichy's and Montague's 
conception and we can show that there is no essential difference in semantic consider-
ations with both of these systems. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
It follows from the preceding paragraphs that it is possible to construct a theory 
which integrates fundamental properties of formal languages and of fragments of 
natural ones, and, at the same time, such a theory can be regarded as a framework 
for an adequate explication of basic semantic notions — sense and meaning. Although 
many authors have tried their best in this domain, only relatively small fragments of 
natural language were described satisfactorily. Thanks to the discussions, referred to 
in the present paper, it seems that if we deal with declarative sentences only, no con-
siderable difficulties occur. But it is not known how to apply results obtained above 
to sentences of other types, namely to interrogative, exclamatory, imperative, etc. 
Thus we suggest that the value of theoretical study presented here should be found 
rather in an exact formulation of vague linguistic notions. At present, of course, we 
* This article was recommended to me by dr. P. Materna. 
cannot exclude that further investigations will show an inadequacy of those mathe-
matical means used here for more comprehensive fragments of natural language. 
On the other hand, the author is sure that the reason for mathematization of study 
of a natural language is just in the fact that it plays an important explanatory role. 
(Received March 25, 1974.) 
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